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Abstract
In each youth justice system, several age limits exist that
indicate what type of reaction can and may be connected to
the degree of responsibility that a person can already bear.
Civil liability, criminal responsibility and criminal majority are
examples of concepts on which age limits are based, but
whose definition and impact is not always clear. Especially
as far as the minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR)
is concerned, confusion exists in legal doctrine. This is appa-
rent from the fact that international comparison tables often
show different MACRs for the same country. Moreover, the
international literature often seems to define youth justice
systems by means of a lower and upper limit, whereas such
a dual distinction is too basic to comprehend the complex
multilayer nature of the systems. This contribution therefore
maps out and conceptually clarifies the different interpreta-
tions and consequences of the several age limits that exist
within youth justice systems. To that extent, the age limits
of six countries are analysed: Argentina, Austria, Belgium,
the Netherlands, New Zealand and Northern Ireland. This
legal comparison ultimately leads to a proposal to establish a
coherent conceptual framework on age limits in youth jus-
tice.
Keywords: youth justice, age limits, minimum age of crim-
inal responsibility, age of criminal majority, legal comparison
1 Introduction
Age limits in youth justice systems are essential to
determine what type of reaction a juvenile offender can
be subject to. International legal doctrine traditionally
distinguishes between the minimum age of criminal
responsibility (MACR) and the age of criminal majority
(ACM) to define the scope of the youth justice system.
Whereas the ACM is fixed at the age of 18 in almost
every country,1 much more diversity can be found with
regard to the MACR, as proven by the several age limits
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1. OECD – Social Policy Division – Directorate of Employment, Labour and
Social Affairs, ‘PF1.8 Legal age threshold regarding transition from
childhood to adulthood’ (2016), at 1-2, www.oecd.org/els/family/
PF_1_8_Age_threshold_Childhood_to_Adulthood.pdf; I. Weijers and
tables in the international comparative literature.2 In
past years, efforts have been made to clarify what the
MACR and its implications are and how it should be
distinguished from the ACM.3 However, other relevant
age limits exist within a youth justice system that
restrict the number of possible reactions, determine the
maximum duration or severity of a reaction or deter-
mine which court or institution is competent. A dual
distinction between the MACR and the ACM is there-
fore too simple to comprehend the complex multilayer
nature of youth justice systems. Moreover, international
comparative tables sometimes show different MACRs
for the same country,4 which suggests that the concept
of ‘criminal responsibility’ is interpreted in different
ways and the ambiguity remains.
This contribution analyses the age limits of six countries
with divergent age limits. Three countries, two of which
are European and one non-European, were selected
because they have a low MACR according to the pre-
vailing comparative tables: the Netherlands, Northern
Ireland and New Zealand. The other three selected
countries, also two European and one non-European,
have a high MACR according to those tables: Belgium,
Austria and Argentina. By mapping out and conceptual-
ly clarifying the different interpretations and conse-
quences of the several age limits within these countries,
the article aims to achieve greater clarity and conceptual
coherence with regard to age limits in youth justice sys-
tems. This article therefore builds, to some extent, on
the more extensive comparative approach that is used in
the comparative analyses in F. Dünkel, J. Grzywa,
F. Imkamp (eds.), Jeugdstrafrecht in internationaal perspectief (2008),
at 270.
2. D. Cipriani, Children’s Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal
Responsibility: A Global Perspective (2009), at 187-224; F. Dünkel,
J. Grzywa, P. Horsfield and I. Pruin (eds.), Juvenile Justice Systems in
Europe: Current Situation and Reform Developments – Vol. 4 (2011),
at 1847; Weijers and Imkamp, above n. 1, at 271; M.F. Aebi, M.M. Tia-
go and C. Burkhardt, ‘SPACE I – Council of Europe Annual Penal Statis-
tics: Prison populations. Survey 2015.’ (2016), at 57, http://wp.unil.ch/
space/files/2017/04/
SPACE_I_2015_FinalReport_161215_REV170425.pdf.
3. Cipriani, above n. 2; L.S. Abrams, S.P. Jordan and L.A. Montero, ‘What
Is a Juvenile? A Cross-National Comparison of Youth Justice Systems’,
18(2) Youth Justice 111-130 (2018).
4. In the following comparative tables, for instance, the Belgian MACR is
18, 16 or 12 respectively: Dünkel et al., above n. 2, at 1793; N. Hazel,
‘Cross-national Comparison of Youth Justice’ (2008), at 30, https://
dera.ioe.ac.uk/7996/1/Cross_national_final.pdf; Cipriani, above n. 2, at
191. The same tables set the Estonian MACR at 7, 14 and 16
respectively: Cipriani, above n. 2, at 197; Dünkel et al., above n. 2, at
1793; Hazel, above n. 4, at 31.
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P. Horsfield and I. Pruin (eds.), Juvenile Justice Systems
in Europe: Current Situation and Reform Developments –
Vol 4 (2011) 1539-1898. However, this article zooms in
only from one particular point of view, namely age lim-
its, and goes beyond merely analysing the differences
between national systems to introduce a conceptual
framework.
The limited size of the article is inevitably accompanied
by choices that result in restrictions of the scope and,
consequently, content limitations. First of all, this con-
tribution examines what we call ‘offence-oriented reac-
tions’, which are reactions that can be imposed from
general criminal law or youth justice5 law to common
offences. Reactions from administrative, civil or youth
care law are consequently excluded from the scope of
this article because they do not react to common
offences or do not primarily aim at reacting to the
offence but at treating the underlying issues of the juve-
nile offender. Second, the focus in this article is on the
age limits of youth justice systems and therefore does
not go into detail on the legal and technical conditions
that accompany them.6 The relevant legal provisions are
always mentioned, so the reader can carefully consult
the conditions to be fulfilled. Lastly, this contribution is
an exploratory study that exposes the multilayered
structure of age limits and, accordingly, proposes a new
classification. However, the new classification has been
tested only in six, albeit diverse, countries, so a verifica-
tion in additional countries will be indispensable to
check the accuracy of the framework and to refine it
where necessary.
2 Comparison of Age Limits
Across Six Countries
2.1 The Netherlands
Unlike many other countries, no separate statutory reg-
ulation on youth justice exists in the Netherlands.
Instead, the Wetboek van Strafrecht (Penal Code, herein-
after PC) and the Wetboek van Strafvordering (Code of
Criminal Procedure, hereinafter CCP) formulate deviat-
ing provisions for juvenile offenders,7 under which
minors from the age of 12 at the time of the offence can
5. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No. 24
(201x), Replacing General Comment No. 10 (2007) on Children’s
Rights in Juvenile Justice’, at 4, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
HRBodies/CRC/GC24/GeneralComment24.pdf: Youth justice refers to
legislation, norms and standards, procedures, mechanisms and provi-
sions, institutions and bodies specifically applicable to children consid-
ered as offenders. Although the UNCRC still uses the notion ‘juvenile
justice’, it acknowledges and encourages the trend towards using terms
such as ‘youth justice’ and ‘child justice’.
6. Whenever expressions such as ‘between the age of 10 and 14’, ‘from
10 until 14 years old’ or ‘a child aged from 10 to 14’ are used, only the
ages 10, 11, 12 and 13 are included. The age that is mentioned last, in
casu 14, is excluded.
7. A.M. van Kalmthout and Z. Bahtiyar, ‘The Netherlands’, in F. Dünkel,
J. Grzywa, P. Horsfield and I. Pruin (eds.), Juvenile Justice Systems in
Europe: Current Situation and Reform Developments – Vol. 2 (2011)
911, at 912.
be prosecuted.8 With regard to minors who commit an
offence under the age of 12, an irrebuttable presumption
of irresponsibility exists. The behaviour of such minors
is dealt with under youth care law, because they are con-
sidered to have ‘growing and parenting problems, psy-
chological problems and disorders’. The Dutch legisla-
ture deliberately chose to link the lower limit to criminal
prosecution, and not to criminal investigation, because
he still wants it to be possible that investigative actions
are carried out with regard to minors who are suspected
of having committed a crime, even if they have not
reached the age of 12.9 That is why Article 487 CCP
allows police officers inter alia to arrest and interrogate a
minor or to enter and search his or her place.10
The general provisions of adult criminal law apply as
soon as the person has reached the age of 18 years at the
time of the offence.11 However, there are two exceptions
to this principle.12 First, Article 77b PC enables the
youth court judge to impose a sentence from the general
criminal law instead of one of the deviating reactions in
the youth justice provisions, but with the exclusion of
life imprisonment.13 In addition to the condition that a
minor must be at least 16 years old at the time of the
commission of the offence, the provisions sets out three
alternative criteria for lowering the upper limit: the seri-
ousness of the offence committed, the personality of the
offender or the circumstances under which the offence
was committed.14 Even though a minor becomes subject
to the provisions of substantive criminal law under this
exception, the rules of investigation, prosecution and
trial are still those of youth justice.15
The second exception is the extended application of the
deviating provisions on youth justice to persons aged
between 18 and 23 years (the ‘young adults’) at the time
of the offence.16 The criminal court judge can use this
possibility when one of two alternative criteria is met,
namely the personality of the offender or the circum-
stances under which the offence was committed. Again,
the exception relates only to the type of reactions avail-
able to the judge and not to the procedural rules appli-
cable, except for the mandatory personal appearance of
the young adult at the trial.17 This means that the young
adult is still tried in accordance with the common crim-
inal procedure provisions but is subject to one of the
reactions provided in the youth justice provisions,
which is then executed in a young offenders institution.
8. Art. 77a PC; Art. 486 CCP; J. uit Beijerse, Jeugdstrafrecht: Beginselen,
wetgeving en praktijk (2019), at 48; Weijers and Imkamp, above n. 1,
at 267.
9. uit Beijerse, above n. 8, at 49.
10. G. De Jonge, ‘The Netherlands’, in V. Patanè (ed.), European Juvenile
Justice Systems (2007) 425, at 427; Cipriani, above n. 2, at 209.
11. Art. 77a PC.
12. Weijers and Imkamp, above n. 1, at 267.
13. Art. 77b(2) PC.
14. Art. 77b(1) PC.
15. Art. 488(2) CCP; uit Beijerse, above n. 8, at 54.
16. Art. 77c PC.
17. uit Beijerse, above n. 8, at 59 and 68; van Kalmthout and Bahtiyar,
above n. 7, at 937.
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Nevertheless, both the HALT measure18 and communi-
ty service19 can be imposed only on juvenile offenders
who have not reached the age of 18 at the time of the
offence.
The existence of these two exceptions indicates that the
Dutch legislature is convinced that young people do not
all develop at the same pace20 and that therefore a fixed
upper limit for applying youth justice reactions is not an
accurate reflection of reality. That is why the boundary
between the youth justice system and the adult justice
system was eased as from 1 April 2014, with the intro-
duction of adolescent criminal law (ACL) for persons
between 16 and 23 years old.21 Youth justice and crim-
inal justice continue to exist side by side, so ACL is not
a separate, new form of criminal law, but merely creates
a closer link between the two systems and stimulates a
flexible use of both systems.22 By adapting the condi-
tions of youth justice reactions and increasing the
emphasis on forensic advice provided by forensic
experts, the judge has more possibilities to take into
account the adolescent’s stage of development and
therefore impose a more appropriate reaction.23
Article 77(h) PC lists all reactions that can be imposed
when a minor is tried on the basis of the youth justice
system. The reactions are not linked to specific age
requirements, which means that they can be imposed on
minors from the age of 12. The duration of custodial
sentences, on the other hand, may depend on age. Juve-
nile offenders under 16 years old can be subject only to
custodial sentences with a maximum duration of one
year, whereas the maximum duration for 16- and 17-
year-olds is two years.24 Both sentences are served in a
young offenders institution.25 In addition, a person may
be subject to a measure of ‘placement in a judicial insti-
tution for young offenders’ (PIY-measure). This meas-
ure can be compared to an in-patient of hospital order
for adults26 and is therefore accompanied with strict,
cumulative conditions.27 The PIY-measure lasts for a
period of three years,28 but the public prosecutor can
ask for an extension of two years, up to a maximum of
seven years.29
18. Ministerie voor Veiligheid en Justitie, ‘Adolescentenstrafrecht: Aanpak
met perspectief’ (2014), at 7, https://wegwijzerjeugdenveiligheid.nl/
fileadmin/user_upload/Bestanden/Onderwerpen/
Adolescentenstrafrecht/Brochure-adolescentenstrafrecht.pdf.
19. Art. 77l(4) PC.
20. Ministerie voor Veiligheid en Justitie, above n. 18, at 5.
21. Wet van 27 november 2013 in verband met de invoering van een ado-
lescentenstrafrecht, Stb. 2013, 485.
22. Ministerie voor Veiligheid en Justitie, above n. 18, at 6.
23. L.J.C. Prop, A.M. van der Laan, C.S. Barendregt, M.G.C.J. Beerthuizen
and Ch. van Nieuwenhuizen, ‘Adolescentenstrafrecht: Kenmerken van
de doelgroep, de strafzaken en de tenuitvoerlegging’ (2018), at 75,
https://www.wodc.nl/binaries/Cahier%202018-9_2460g_Volledige
%20tekst_tcm28-328944.pdf.
24. Art. 77i PC; van Kalmthout and Bahtiyar, above n. 7, at 913.
25. Art. 8(e) Beginselenwet Jusitiële Jeugdinrichtingen.
26. van Kalmthout and Bahtiyar, above n. 7, at 946.
27. Art. 77s(1) PC.
28. Art. 77s(7) PC.
29. Arts. 77t(1) and (2) PC.
2.2 Northern Ireland
Under youth justice, minors in Northern Ireland can be
called to account for their actions at a very young age, as
is typical of common law systems. Section 3 of the
Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order
(hereinafter CJO), more specifically, provides for an
irrebuttable presumption that children under the age of
10 cannot be guilty of an offence. The criminal behav-
iour of minors under the age of 10 can only be the
subject of measures under child welfare legislation,
namely the Children Order 1995.30 In that case, the
child has to be ‘in need’ or is ‘likely to suffer significant
harm’.31
The upper limit has been raised from the age of 17-18
since the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act (hereinafter JA)
of 2002.32 That means that persons 18 and over are tried
and punished in accordance with adult criminal law pro-
visions. Northern Ireland does not have any exceptions
that raise the upper age limit with regard to young
adults. However, the upper limit can be lowered in the
very exceptional case that a minor has been charged
with homicide or has been co-accused with an adult.33
Although rare, it is therefore possible for a minor to be
transferred to an adult court and consequently be
subject to adult criminal law from the age of 10. How-
ever, in the case of co-accusation with an adult, the
juvenile offender can be tried in the adult court only as
far as the guilt is concerned, since the case is referred
back to the youth court for sentencing when he or she is
found guilty.34
In terms of sentencing practices, young adults between
16 and 21 (and exceptionally 24) years old who have
been sentenced to imprisonment on the basis of a young
offenders centre order have to serve their custodial sen-
tence in an adapted detention institution, namely a
young offenders centre.35 The maximum duration of
detention in a young offender centre is four years, but
when the young adult reaches 21 years of age, he may be
transferred to an adult prison.36 The person is in any
case automatically transferred to adult prison at the age
of 24.37 In addition, minors between 10 and 17 years old
can be subject to a juvenile justice centre order and are
committed to a juvenile justice centre to serve their cus-
30. X, ‘A Review of the Youth Justice System in Northern Ireland’ (2011), at
21, https://restorativejustice.org.uk/sites/default/files/resources/files/
Report%20of%20the%20Youth%20Justice%20System%20in%20
Northern%20Ireland.pdf; D. O’Mahony, ‘Northern Ireland’, in F. Dün-
kel, J. Grzywa, P. Horsfield and I. Pruin (eds.), Juvenile Justice Systems
in Europe: Current Situation and Reform Developments – Vol. 2 (2011)
957, at 961.
31. Section 17, 50 62, 63, 65 66, 129 Child Order 1995.
32. Section 63 JA juncto scheme 11, section 17 JA. Section (2) (2) CJO now
defines an adult as ‘a person who has attained the age of 18’ and a
child as ‘a person who is under the age of 18’.
33. Section 29 (1) CJO; O’Mahony, above n. 30, at 976.
34. Section 29 (2) (b) (ii) and 32 CJO.
35. Section 5 (1) Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968.
36. Section 5 (1) (ii) Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968;
O’Mahony, above n. 30, at 971.
37. Section 8 (1) and (2) Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland)
1968.
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todial sentence.38 This is also the case for 17-year-olds
in two specific situations.39 The duration of a juvenile
justice centre order is six months to two years.40 In case
the court has made a custody care order with regard to a
minor, the use of detention in a juvenile justice centre is
restricted to juvenile offenders at least 14 years old.41
Children between 10 and 14 years old who are subject to
a custody care order are accommodated in the child care
system instead.42
Finally, the application of certain reactions under the
Northern Irish youth justice system requires a certain
minimum age. Community services and probation, for
example, can be imposed only on juvenile offenders
aged 16 or older.43 Moreover, the level of fines is higher
for minors who have reached the age of 14,44 and the
child only has to pay the fine itself, instead of his or her
parent or guardian, from the age of 16.45
2.3 New Zealand
As a former British colony, the legislation of New Zea-
land is remarkably influenced by the laws of the UK.46
Following the English laws, the age below which a child
cannot be convicted of an offence was set at 7 in New
Zealand.47 However, in 1961 (post colonisation) it was
raised to 10 years.48 Offenders were considered minors
until the age of 17 only until recently:49 the upper age
limit was revised to 18 years since the Children’s and
Young People’s Well-being Act 1989 (CYW Act) was
passed on 13 July 2017 and came into force on 1 July
2019.50
In the youth justice system of New Zealand a conceptual
distinction is used: ‘children’ are defined as those under
the age of 14. Minors between the age of 14 and 18 are
called ‘young persons’.51 In general, children are subject
to the care and protection provisions of the CYW Act,
while young persons are covered by the youth justice
provisions.52 The youth justice system in New Zealand
has a threefold structure.
1. According to section 21 of the Crimes Act, minors
under the age of 10 cannot be convicted of an
offence. Children below that age are dealt with
38. Section 13 (1) (a) CJO.
39. Section 39 (3A) CJO.
40. Section 39 (2) CJO.
41. Section 44A (8) and 44C (1) CJO.
42. D. O’Mahony and C. Campbell, ‘Mainstreaming Restorative Justice for
Young Offenders through Youth Conferencing: The Experience of
Northern Ireland’, in J. Junger-Tas and S. H. Decker (eds.), International
Handbook of Juvenile Justice (2006) 93, at 99.
43. Section 3C (2) CJO; X, above n. 30, at 26.
44. Section 34, 41 (2) (a) and 44F (3) and (4) CJO.
45. Section 35 (1) and 41 (2B) CJO.
46. A. Morris, ‘Youth Justice in New Zealand’, 31 Crime & Justice 243, at
246 (2004).
47. Ibid., at 247.
48. Section 21 Crimes Act, No. 43.
49. Section 272 Children, Young Persons and Their Families Legislation Act
1989, No. 3.
50. Section 272 CYW Act.
51. Section 2 (1) CYW Act.
52. A.J. Becroft, ‘Children and Young People in Conflict with the Law: Ask-
ing the Hard Questions’, (57) Juvenile & Family Court Journal 1, at 8
(2006); Morris, above n. 46, at 260.
under the care and protection system.53 A broad
definition of ‘a child or young person in need of care
and protection’ is given in section 14 CYW Act.
2. Likewise, children between the age of 10 and 14
cannot be charged with a crime. However, this pre-
sumption of irresponsibility can be rebutted when
‘he or she knew that the act or omission was wrong
or that it was contrary to law’.54 This second catego-
ry of minors consists of two subcategories.55 First of
all, children aged 10 and 11 can be prosecuted only
in case of murder or manslaughter. After the pre-
trial in the youth court, a child charged with one of
the aforementioned offences is sentenced in an adult
criminal court (high court) according to adult law.56
The second subcategory consists of children of 12
or 13 years of age, who can be prosecuted not only
for murder or manslaughter, but also for other seri-
ous offences. Again, the trial of children charged
with murder and manslaughter takes place in high
court, whereas children prosecuted for other serious
offences are sentenced in a youth court.57 When the
aforementioned conditions are not fulfilled and the
presumption of irresponsibility cannot be rebutted,
children who commit a crime are covered by the
care and protection system.58
3. The third group consists of offenders between 14
and 18 years old. These young persons can be
charged with any criminal offence under the youth
justice system, except for (a) murder and man-
slaughter, (b) some serious offences for which the
minor asks trial by jury, (c) when the minor is
charged jointly with another person and will have a
trial by jury and (d) for traffic offences not punisha-
ble by imprisonment. With regard to these four
types of offences, a minor between the age of 14 and
18 is automatically tried in an adult court (district or
high court) and receives an adult sentence.59 Apart
from this automatic transfer, a judicial transfer is
possible as well: the youth court has the discretion
to decide whether or not to transfer a 15-year-old or
a 14-year-old who committed certain serious
offences (other than the four aforementioned
offences) to the district court or high court.60 In
adult court, the young age of the offender can be
considered as a mitigating circumstance.61 On
reaching the age of 18, offenders will always be held
responsible in adult criminal courts under adult
criminal law.
53. Section 14 CYW; Becroft, above n. 52, at 8.
54. Section 22 of the Crimes Act.
55. Section 272 CYW Act.
56. Section 272(2) and 275 (2)(b) CYW Act; F. Chye, ‘When Children Kill:
The Age of Criminal Responsibility and Criminal Procedure in New Zea-
land’, 2 New Zealand Law Students Journal 837, at 841 (2012).
57. Section 272 (2A) and 272A CYW Act.
58. Becroft, above n. 52, at 8.
59. Section 272, 273 and 275 CYW Act.
60. Section 283(o) and 285(6) CYW Act.
61. Section 9(2)(a) Sentencing Act 2002.
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Since the New Zealand youth justice system is focused
on diversion, family participation in decision-making,
restorative justice and victim involvement, the youth
court is less influential than in other countries.62 The set
of reactions, which are called ‘orders’ to restrain the
stigmatising effect of a sanction, seems rather mild.
Moreover, the imposed orders expire when the minor
attains the age of 19.63 Children or young persons who
are subject to a ‘supervision with residence order’ are
detained in a specialised youth justice residence,64 while
(exceptionally) minors who are transferred to adult
court can be detained in prison.65 A supervision with
residence order can be imposed for a minimum of three
months and no longer than six months. Finally, an order
to pay the costs of the prosecution needs to be executed
only by the minor, instead of his parents, from the age
of 16.66
2.4 Belgium
Belgium is a federal state, consisting of three communi-
ties: the Flemish, French and German-speaking Com-
munity.67 Until recently, youth justice was mainly a fed-
eral competence, regulated by the Jeugdbeschermingswet
(Youth Protection Act).68 However, due owing to the
sixth state reform of 2014, the communities have been
empowered to regulate the judicial reaction (nature, cri-
teria, content and hierarchy) towards juvenile delin-
quency on their territory.69 The procedural issues
remain a competence of the federal state.70 In concrete
terms this means the Flemish, French and German-
speaking Community as well as the Common Commun-
ity Committee of Brussels (CCC)71 can enact their own
legislation regarding youth justice. Since the German-
speaking Community has not yet issued its own legisla-
tion in this regard, this article will focus on the decrees
of the Flemish and French Community and the statute
of the CCC.
On 15 February 2019 the Jeugddelinquentiedecreet
(Flemish Decree on Juvenile Delinquency, hereinafter
Flemish Decree) was ratified.72 The Flemish Decree
applies to minors who are at least 12 years old at the
time of the offence.73 By virtue of an irrebuttable pre-
62. A. Morris and G. Maxwell, ‘Reforming Juvenile Justice: The New Zea-
land Experience’, 77(2) The Prison Journal 125, at 127 (1997).
63. Section 296 CYW Act.
64. Section 283(n), 311, 361(h) and 365 CYW Act.
65. Section 18 Sentencing Act 2002.
66. Section 283 (e) and (f) CYW Act.
67. Art. 2 Federal Constitution of 17 February 1994.
68. Wet van 8 April 1965 betreffende de jeugdbescherming.
69. E. Dumortier, J. Christiaens and A. Nuytiens, ‘Belgium’, in S.H. Decker
and N. Marteache (eds.), International Handbook of Juvenile Justice
(2016) 239, at 240.
70. Ibid.
71. Brussels is a bilingual territory (Dutch-speaking and French-speaking).
The powers concerning this territory are divided between the Flemish
Community, the French Community and the Common Community
Committee. Regarding juvenile justice, it is the Common Community
Committee that has the jurisdiction to enact legislation.
72. Decreet van 15 februari 2019 betreffende het jeugddelinquentierecht;
J. Put and J. Leenknecht (eds.), Het Vlaamse jeugddelinquentierecht
(2019).
73. Art. 2(10) and Section 4(1) Flemish Decree.
sumption of irresponsibility,74 children under the age of
12 can be covered by the youth care system only if they
are in an ‘alarming situation’.75
The upper limit is set at 18 years, so offenders aged 18
or older are held responsible under adult criminal law.76
However, there are some exceptions to this general rule:
– Offenders aged 16 or 17 can be transferred to a spe-
cial chamber of the youth court,77 where he or she is
treated according to adult criminal law. Certain con-
ditions must be fulfilled before the (regular) youth
court can decide whether or not the minor should
be transferred.78
– When a minor aged 16 or 17 commits a traffic
offence, he or she will automatically be prosecuted
in adult criminal court, except when the latter con-
siders a reaction-based on the Flemish Decree more
adequate or when this traffic offence is connected to
another offence.79
As far as the possible reactions to the offence are con-
cerned, custodial measures or sentences are always exe-
cuted in specialised institutions. They can be imposed
only on offenders who were at least 14 years old at the
time of the offence (even 16 with respect to the custodial
sentence ‘long detention’). Only exceptionally can these
reactions apply to minors aged 12 or 13 at the time of
the offence.80 At the age of 23, the measures or sanctions
imposed by the youth court are terminated.81 Again,
this should be nuanced: the duration of the ‘long deten-
tion’ reaction depends on the age of the offender, caus-
ing a layered system in which an offender aged 12 or 13
at the time of the offence can be subject to long deten-
tion for a maximum of two years, a 14- or 15-year-old
for a maximum of five years and a 16- or 17-year-old for
a maximum of seven years.82 Consequently, a long
detention imposed on an offender aged 17 at the time of
the offence can be carried out until the age of 25. In
addition, the long detention reaction can be combined
with preventive custody of (maximum) ten years, which
begins as soon as the long detention is finished.83 The
preventive custody takes place in a youth facility.
The French community adopted the Décret portant le
code de la Prévention, de l’Aide à la jeunesse et de la Pro-
tection de la Jeunesse (Decree on Prevention, Youth Aid
and Youth Protection) on 18 January 2018 (French
Community Decree, hereinafter FCD).84 Contrary to
the Flemish Decree, the FCD remains silent on the low-
er age limit. Even more so, article 101 (4) rules that
minors under the age of 12 at the time of the offence can
74. Art. 4(2) Flemish Decree.
75. Art. 2(1)(54) Decree integral youth care.
76. Art. 2(10) Flemish Decree.
77. Serious offences will be dealt with in the court of assizes.
78. Art. 38 Flemish Decree.
79. Art. 5 Flemish Decree.
80. Arts. 35, 36 and 37 Flemish Decree.
81. Art. 6 Flemish Decree.
82. Art. 37 Flemish Decree.
83. Art. 37(8) Flemish Decree.
84. Décret du 18 janvier 2018 portant le code de la prévention, de l’aide à
la jeunesse et de la protection de la jeunesse.
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be subject to certain provisional measures (supervision,
guidance and specialised guidance). As regards the final
measures, article 109 states that a child below the age of
12 can be subject only to the measure of reprimand.
These two provisions indicate that a child below the age
of 12 can be held criminally responsible, but the FCD
does not specify what the ultimate lower age limit
should be, so that the latter remains undefined.
With regard to the upper age limit, the FCD states that
it applies to offenders below the age of 18.85 The two
exceptions of the Flemish Decree concerning the upper
age limit can also be found in the FCD (i.e. transfer to a
special chamber of the youth court86 and traffic
offences87).
As to the measures to be imposed, custodial sentences
(which are executed in specialised institutions) can be
applied only if the minor was aged 14 or older at the
time of the offence.88 Only exceptionally can a 12- or
13-year-old be detained.89 Provisional measures can be
imposed or upheld until the offender is 20 years old.90
The final measures continue to be carried out until the
age of 18, and exceptionally until the age of 20.91
The Ordonnantie betreffende de Jeugdhulpverlening en
Jeugdbescherming of the CCC (Statute on Youth Care
and Child Protection)92 was ratified on 16 May 2019 and
applies to offenders who are at least 12 years old at the
time of the offence.93 As in the Flemish Decree, an irre-
buttable presumption of irresponsibility exists towards
children under the age of 12,94 and once the age of 18
has been reached, the offender is tried in the adult crim-
inal court.95 Likewise, the same exceptions as in the
Flemish Decree and the FCD concerning the transfer of
16- or 17-year-olds to a special chamber of the court96
and traffic offences97 apply in Brussels.
Again, there are some age limits concerning the reac-
tions on the criminal offence. First, not every judicial
reaction is applicable to offenders of 12 years. For
instance, custodial sentences can be imposed when the
minor is at least 14 years old (in exceptional circum-
stances when the minor is 12 or 13 years old),98 whereas
working with a view to paying damages to the victim can
be ordered only when the child is at least 15 years
old.99Furthermore, imposing or upholding provisional
measures is possible until the age of 20.100 Final meas-
ures, on the other hand, last until the minor turns 18.
85. Art. 55-56 FCD.
86. Art. 125 FCD.
87. Art. 56 FCD.
88. Arts. 124(2) and (3) FCD.
89. Art. 124(4) FCD.
90. Art. 101 FCD.
91. Art. 110 FCD.
92. Ordonnantie van 16 mei 2019 betreffende de jeugdhulpverlening en
jeugdbescherming.
93. Art. 17(2) CCC statute.
94. Ibid.
95. Art. 18 CCC statute.
96. Art. 89 CCC statute.
97. Art. 19 CCC statute.
98. Arts. 73, 74, 85 and 86 CCC statute.
99. Arts. 77 and 81 CCC statute.
100. Art. 65 CCC statute.
However, the measures can exceptionally sustain until
the offender reaches the age of 23.101 The decision of a
reprimand, lastly, is possible any time, regardless of the
age of the offender.102
2.5 Austria
Austrian youth justice is regulated by a separate law, i.e.
the Jugendgerichtsgesetz (Juvenile Court Act, hereinafter
JCA), but the Strafgesetzbuch (Penal Code, hereinafter
PC) and the Strafprozeßordnung (Code of Criminal
Procedure, hereinafter CCP) apply when the JCA does
not provide for a specific youth justice rule. Influenced
by Soviet law,103 the provisions of the JCA apply to
minors between 14 and 18 years old.104 As a conse-
quence, minors under the age of 14 are not punisha-
ble105 and can only be subject to measures under the
Bundes Kinder- und Jugendhilfegesetz (Children and
Youth Services Act, hereinafter CYSA), which apply if
the welfare of the child is not guaranteed with regard to
the care and upbringing.106 Although minors may, in
principle, be prosecuted for their committed offence
from the age of 14, there are two exceptions on the basis
of which such a minor remains unpunished. The first
exception is the so-called ‘delayed maturity’, when the
minor is not yet mature enough to see the injustice of
the act or to act in accordance with insight.107 The sec-
ond exception concerns minors who commit an offence
before reaching the age of 16 but have no serious fault
on their part and against whom no special reasons exist
for the application of the youth justice system in order
to prevent recidivism (‘moderate misdemeanours’).108
The Austrian youth justice system therefore applies in a
gradual manner according to the minor’s capacity to
assess the consequences of his or her actions.
The upper limit on the other hand, is strictly set at the
age of 18.109 This means that minors can under no
circumstances be subject to adult criminal law; no
system of transfer to adult criminal law exists. Concomi-
tantly, the maximum duration of custodial sentences in
the youth justice system is much higher: as a general
rule, the maximum sentences under adult criminal law
are reduced by half,110 but life imprisonment is replaced
by a custodial sentence of 1 to 15 years for minors aged
at least 16 or of 1 to 10 years for minors between 14 and
16 years old at the time of the offence.111 An imprison-
ment from 10 to 20 years is also replaced by a detention
from 6 months to 10 years.112 The age at which a con-
vict starts to serve his or her custodial sentence is deci-
sive in determining whether he is covered by the juve-
101. Art. 78 CCC statute.
102. Art. 79 CCC statute.
103. Cipriani, above n. 2, at 109.
104. Section 1(1) and (2) JCA.
105. Section 4(1) JCA.
106. Section 1(4) CYSA.
107. Section 4(2) (1) JCA.
108. Section 4(2) (2) JCA.
109. Weijers and Imkamp, above n. 1, at 279.
110. Section 5(4) JCA.
111. Section 5(2) JCA.
112. Section 5(3) JCA.
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nile or adult detention system.113 Only convicts that
have not reached the age of 18 are incarcerated in an
institution for juvenile detention. However, persons up
to 22 years old can also begin to serve their sentence in a
juvenile detention centre, if no negative or other detri-
mental effects on juvenile convicts is to be expected.114
In certain circumstances, the convict can even remain
subordinated to juvenile detention until he or she turns
24 in order to serve his or her sentence, but under no
circumstances later than the age of 27.115 In the latter
case, the person has to be transferred to a regular prison.
Since the upper limit was lowered from 19 to 18 years
old in 2001, a separate criminal law for persons between
18 and 21 years old (‘young adults’) was created as a
compensation.116 The compensation is, however, limit-
ed to declaring most of the procedural provisions appli-
cable to young adults and does not constitute substan-
tive law regulations for this age group.117 Young adults
are consequently still subject to the range of sentences
of adult criminal law as laid down in the PC. Section 34
PC nevertheless refers to section 19 JCA, which states
that young adults cannot be subject to custodial senten-
ces exceeding a duration of 15 years. As a consequence,
custodial sentences exceeding a duration of 15 years and
life imprisonment are excluded as a possible penalty.
Moreover, section 36(1)(1) PC includes the commission
of an offence between the ages of 18 and 21 as a mitigat-
ing circumstance.
Austria has no separate institutionalised youth court,
which means that youth cases are dealt with under dis-
trict courts or regional courts for criminal matters.118
Within these courts, however, departments for youth
cases have been established. They are composed of spe-
cialised judges and prosecutors and deal with offences
committed by 14- to 21-year olds.119 Section 30 JGG,
more specifically, stipulates that the judges and prose-
cutors in charge of a youth case must have pedagogical
skills and some expertise with regard to psychology and
social work. In addition, where a court of lay judges or a
jury is to decide on the youth case, there always has to
be a judge who is or has been active in the teaching pro-
fession, as educators or in public or private child and
youth welfare or youth care.120 The type of court and its
composition (single judge or professional and lay
judges) that deals with the specific case depends on the
qualification of the offence and the possible reaction
according to the JGG.121 The regional court, for
113. K. Bruckmüller, A. Pilgram and G. Stummvoll, ‘Austria’, in F. Dünkel,
J. Grzywa, P. Horsfield and I. Pruin (eds.), Juvenile Justice Systems in
Europe: Current Situation and Reform Developments – Vol. 1 (2011)
41, at 85.
114. Section 55(3) (1) JCA.
115. Section 55(3) (2) JCA.
116. K. Bruckmüller, ‘Austria: A Protection Model’, in J. Junger-Tas and S. H.
Decker (eds.), International Handbook of Juvenile Justice (2006) 263,
at 264; Weijers and Imkamp, above n. 1, at 281.
117. Section 46a JCA; Bruckmüller et al., above n. 113, at 43.
118. Bruckmüller et al., above n. 113, at 57.
119. Bruckmüller, above n. 116, at 228-229.
120. Section 28 JGG.
121. E. Coutteel, K. Herbots, S. Lembrechts, J. Put, N. Sporen, and A. Vers-
weyvelt, ‘Rapport 5. Jeugdrechtsystemen in vergelijking’ (2015), at
instance, adjudicates cases as a jury court with regard to
offences committed by persons under the age of 21.122
2.6 Argentina
Argentina has enacted legislation that (partly) regulates
the status, rights and obligations of minor delinquents,
despite the lack of a formal, separate youth justice
system.123 The main sources that concern juvenile
offenders are Ley 22.278 Régimen Penal de la Minoridad
(Act 22.278 on Youth Justice)124 and Ley 26.061 Protec-
ción Integral de los Derechos de Niños, Niñas y Adoles-
centes (Act 26.061 on Integral Protection of the
Child).125 Awaiting a formal and specialised youth jus-
tice system, which is the aim of the four-year plan ‘Jus-
ticia 2020’ (infra), these acts are still in force.
Section 1 of Act 22.278 prescribes that children below
the age of 16 who commit a criminal offence are not
punishable. Likewise, offenders aged 16 or 17 cannot be
prosecuted, except when they commit offences that are
punishable with prison sentences of two years or
more.126 The sanction applied is the one that is provided
for in the adult PC.127 The youth court (which has juris-
diction concerning offences committed by offenders
aged 16 or 17 at the time of the offence)128 can also
decide not to impose a sentence at all or to reduce the
sanction to the penalty that an adult would receive in
case of attempt.129 Moreover, the sanction imposed can
be executed only from the moment that the offender
turns 18 and after he or she has been subject to at least
one year of ‘protective treatment’.130 Persons who have
reached the age of 18 can be prosecuted for any crime,
are fully subject to adult criminal law and are sentenced
by the criminal court.131
Section 6 of Act 22.278 states custodial sentences (for
which there is no maximum duration132) shall be execu-
ted in specialised institutions, but as soon as the offend-
er reaches the age of majority (18) he or she is trans-
ferred to adults prisons to serve the rest of the sentence.
However, considering the fact that a sanction imposed
on an offender who was a minor at the time of the
offence can be executed only from the age of 18, section
6 is without value. The logical explanation for this con-
V-46, https://www.law.kuleuven.be/isr/omgevingsanalyse-volledig-
rapport-1.
122. Section 27 JGG.
123. Abrams et al., above n. 3, at 118; R.M. Pages, ‘Infancia, adolescencia,
delito y sistema penal en Argentina’, 5 Misión Jurídica: Revista de dere-
cho y ciencias sociales 71, at 73 (2012).
124. Act 22.278 of 20 August 1980, Régimen Penal de la Minoridad.
125. Act 26.061 of 29 September 2005, Protección Integral de los Derechos
de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes.
126. Section 2 of Act 22.278.
127. A.M. Giorgio and C. López Bernis, Medidas alternativas a la pena de
prisión: la probación (2005), at 107.
128. Section 28 Codigo Procesal Penal (Criminal Procedural Code).
129. Ministry of Justice and Human Rights of Argentina, Secretary of Human
Rights Argentina and Unicef Argentina, Privados de Libertad. Situación
de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes en la Argentina (2006), at 34; Abrams
et al., above n. 3, at 118.
130. Section 4 of Act 22.278.
131. Abrams et al., above n. 3, at 119.
132. Hazel, above n. 4, at 62.
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tradiction is that section 6 dates from the time that the
age of majority was still 21.
The main problem in the current Argentine legal system
is the broad discretion of judges concerning children
below the age of 16 (as a remainder of the old theory of
the situación irregular).133 When those children commit
an offence, formally a penalty cannot be imposed
because of the legal presumption of lack of criminal
responsibility. However, section 1 of Act 22.278 shows
that when a minor has been abandoned and is indigent,
is in ‘material or moral danger’ or has behavioural prob-
lems, a deprivation of liberty is justified (as a measure of
‘protection’) until the age of majority (18).134 This ‘pro-
tective confinement’ is often used as a hidden punish-
ment.135 Act 26.061 had the intention to resolve this
problem by making a clear distinction between minors
in a vulnerable situation and minors who commit
offences, but this practice nevertheless still exists.136
At the time of writing this article, Argentina is in a tran-
sitional period. As mentioned previously, the Argentine
way of dealing with juvenile offenders has been criti-
cised.137 Justicia 2020, a project of the ministry of justice
aiming to lead to major changes in Argentine legal poli-
cy, wants to resolve the criticisms.138 The main goals of
Justicia 2020 regarding youth justice are the establish-
ment of a separate youth justice system that meets
human rights and the provision of an adequate reaction
to children in conflict with the law.139 In order to reach
these goals, Argentina plans to lower the age below
which a person cannot be prosecuted from 16 to 15
years old, although 15-year-old offenders could be pun-
ished only when they commit a crime that is punishable
with a term of imprisonment of fifteen years or more.
The old system would continue to exist regarding 16-
and 17-year-old offenders (i.e. offences that are punish-
able with prison sentences of two years or more).
3 Findings: Five Relevant
(Clusters of) Age Limits in
Youth Justice Systems
The analysis of age limits in six diverse countries shows
that a youth justice system is composed of many more
age limits than just a lower and upper limit, which,
133. Abrams et al., above n. 3, at 118.
134. Section 3 of Act 22.278; Ministry of Justice and Human Rights of
Argentina, Secretary of Human Rights Argentina and Unicef Argentina,
above n. 129, at 34; M. Beloff, ‘Los adolescentes y el sistema penal.
Elementos para una discusión necesaria en la Argentina actual’, 1 Revis-
ta Jurídica de la Universidad de Palermo 97, at 102 (2005).
135. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Rapporteurship on the
Rights of the Child, Justicia juvenil y derechos humanos en las Améri-
cas (2011), at 16.
136. Section 19 concerning deprivation of liberty and section 27 concerning
minimum guarantees.
137. Beloff, above n. 134, at 102.
138. https://www.justicia2020.gob.ar/eje-penal/sistema-penal-juvenil/.
139. Ibid.
moreover, are not even the same in all circumstances.
Five types of age limits can be identified that are rele-
vant to determine how a juvenile offender’s offence is
reacted upon, some of which can also be subject to dero-
gations. The categories of age limits are first described
in neutral terms, using examples from the analysed
youth justice systems, and subsequently a specific term
and definition are proposed for each type of age limit.
3.1 Lower Age Limit
3.1.1 Findings
First of all, all six systems appear to have an age below
which a minor may under no circumstances be
addressed within the framework of youth justice or
criminal justice: they cannot be imposed on an offence-
oriented reaction due to an irrebuttable presumption of
irresponsibility. That lower age limit is fixed at 10 in
Northern Ireland and New Zealand, at 12 in the Neth-
erlands, the Flemish Community and Brussels, at 14 in
Austria, and at 16 in Argentina. In the French Com-
munity of Belgium, on the contrary, the lower age limit
remains undefined. The FCD only stipulates that
offenders under the age of 12 can be subject to four spe-
cific non-custodial reactions, but these possibilities con-
cern reaction age limits (infra under c)) and not the low-
er age limit of the youth justice system.
The temporal point of reference is always the age at the
time of the commission of the offence. However, the
terminology used to indicate what is possible once a
minor has reached the under age limit, varies widely
from one country to another. In the Netherlands, such a
minor can be prosecuted,140 in Northern Ireland he can
become guilty of an offence,141 in New Zealand he can
be convicted of an offence,142 in Brussels he can be
responsible for his acts143 and in Austria144 and Argenti-
na145 he can be punished from that age onwards. While
these systems define a specific consequence of their low-
er age limit, albeit a different consequence in each one
of them, the Flemish Decree does not indicate a specific
point of reference. Instead, it links the application of the
whole youth justice system to reaching the under age
limit, since it states to apply to minors, who are persons
between 12 and 18 years old.146 As mentioned previous-
ly, the FCD is silent on the lower age limit and, as a
consequence, on the point of reference as well.
Minors who commit an offence under the specified low-
er age limit are subject to the national youth welfare law
or civil law. Each of the countries requires the minor to
be in a state of need (of protection) or to have certain
behavioural or psychological problems before one of the
welfare or civil measures can be imposed. If so, these
measures may even include deprivation of liberty and
are, in the worst case, used as a hidden punishment.
140. Art. 486 CCP.
141. Section 3 CJO.
142. Section 21 Crimes Act, No. 43.
143. Art. 17(2) CCC statute, a contrario.
144. Section 4(1) JCA.
145. Section 1 and 2 Law 22.278 on Youth Justice.
146. Art. 2(10) juncto Art. 4(1) Flemish Decree.
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The latter appears to be the case in Argentina and is
considered to be an inevitable consequence of the high
lower age limit.147 This shows that the establishment of
a separate youth justice system and a lower age limit are
not sanctifying, nor does it guarantee that no other
(implicit) offence-oriented reactions exist. One should
therefore not be fixated on age limits, but also, and even
more, take account of the consequences. After all, inter-
ventions based on another system can be equally intru-
sive and, moreover, offer a lower level of legal protec-
tion.
Since we define the lower age limit as the age following
from which it is possible that a minor’s offence is reac-
ted upon under youth justice or criminal justice, albeit
only for one type of offence, there is no case in which
that age limit is lowered any further. It is, however, not
inconceivable that minors under that age limit may nev-
ertheless already be the subject of investigative measures
under the youth justice system. That can, for example,
be the case when the perpetrator of the committed
offence is not yet known and the authorities are there-
fore not aware of his or her age. It is, however, only the
Dutch legislature that expresses and regulates this pos-
sibility.148
In some countries, on the other hand, the lower age lim-
it can be raised depending on the offence committed
and/or the moral condition of the minor. Under New
Zealand youth justice it is legally possible to prosecute a
10- or 11-year-old, and hence the aforementioned lower
age limit of 10, but only in case of murder or man-
slaughter and if the minor is aware of the illegality of his
behaviour. For serious offences other than murder or
manslaughter, the lower age limit is set at 12 years, but
the condition of awareness of illegality remains. It is
only at the age of 14 that a minor can be prosecuted in
any case, regardless of the seriousness of the offence
committed or the accountability of the minor. As a con-
sequence, the lower age limit can be raised up to 14
years when none of the two aforementioned conditions
are met. In Austria, the lower age limit of 14 can be
raised to 16 in case of moderate misdemeanours, i.e.
offences for which the minor does not have serious fault
and for which there is no need to prevent recidivism
through youth justice. In addition, the delayed maturity
of a minor can make him indefinitely exempt from pros-
ecution under youth justice, and the minor can there-
fore in extremis be prosecuted and punished only from
the age of 18, when the criminal justice system princi-
pally applies.
3.1.2 Proposal for Clearer Terminology
The lower age limit is defined in this article as the age
below which an offence-oriented reaction on a minor
can under no circumstances be imposed owing to an
irrebuttable presumption of irresponsibility. This defi-
nition is in line with the requirement of article 40 (3) (a)
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, that the
147. Abrams et al., above n. 3, at 118-119.
148. Art. 487 CCP.
state parties should establish a minimum age below
which children shall be presumed not to have the
capacity to infringe the penal law. The lower age limit as
described in chapter 3.1.1 of this article can therefore be
identified as what is generally called the minimum age
of criminal responsibility or the MACR. However, we
believe that many of the interpretation issues around the
MACR arise from the concept itself, which uses the
term ‘criminal responsibility’. Since all six countries
have or are working on a youth justice system that is dif-
ferent from their criminal justice system, the reference
to criminal responsibility to define the lower age limit
causes confusion. It might be more accurate to use ‘the
minimum age of youth justice responsibility’ (MAYR)
as an expression of the lower age limit, since it indicates
the moment from when on a minor can be addressed
within the framework of youth justice. And even with
this refinement, the internal points of reference will still
be different: as noted above, prosecution, conviction,
guilt, responsibility and punishment are five possibili-
ties, and that only within six analysed countries. In case
a youth justice system provides for the possibility to
raise the MACR/MAYR related to the type of the com-
mitted offence and/or the moral condition of the minor,
we introduce the obvious term ‘raised MACR/MAYR’.
Minimum age of criminal responsibility
(MACR)/
Minimum age of youth justice responsibili-
ty (MAYR)
The age, at the time of the offence, from which on a
minor can be imposed an offence-oriented reaction
under the youth justice system
Related concept: raised MACR/MAYR
3.2 Upper Age Limit
3.2.1 Findings
The second traditional age limit set by the countries is
the upper age limit of their youth justice system. It is
the age from which on a person is, in general, no longer
subject to the youth justice provisions but is automati-
cally held accountable under the adult criminal justice
system. In all six systems analysed, the upper limit is
fixed at the age of 18, which confirms the observation in
the international literature that there is more or less an
international consensus in this regard.149
In the majority of the countries analysed, there is an
exception that lowers the upper age limit. In the Neth-
erlands and Belgium, minors can be transferred to the
adult criminal justice system from the age of 16, albeit
under strict conditions. Whereas the transfer in the
Netherlands concerns only the application of the sub-
stantive criminal provisions, and consequently the pos-
sible reactions of the youth judge to the committed
offence, the transfer in Belgium also implies that the
149. Cipriani, above n. 2, at 158.
21
Jantien Leenknecht, Johan Put & Katrijn Veeckmans doi: 10.5553/ELR.000151 - ELR augustus 2020 | No. 1
minor is tried in accordance with the adult criminal
procedure.150 In both countries, the decision to transfer
a minor to the criminal justice system is at the discretion
of the youth judge, except in the case of traffic offences
in Belgium, where the transfer takes place automatically.
In Northern Ireland and New Zealand, the upper age
limit can be lowered all the way down to the lower age
limit, which is 10 in both countries. Northern Ireland
allows for the application of criminal law provisions to a
minor only in the case of homicide or to determine guilt
in the case of co-accusation with an adult, after which
the minor is remitted to a youth court. Likewise, in
New Zealand, minors between 10 and 14 can be tried in
accordance with adult criminal law only in case of mur-
der or manslaughter. With regard to minors between 14
and 18, there is an automatic transfer to the criminal
court in four specific cases, and a discretionary decision
of the youth court in other (serious) cases. With the
exception of the latter case, and contrary to the Nether-
lands and Belgium, the upper age limit is automatically
lowered in these two countries when certain conditions
are fulfilled.
Finally, Austria and Argentina do not lower their upper
age limit under any circumstances. It is no coincidence
that they are also the two countries that adopt the adult
criminal sentences in their youth justice system, albeit
with some restrictions. The four other countries, in con-
trast, provide for adapted youth justice measures with
relatively low maximum sentences. As a compensation,
they use a flexible upper limit, which allows them to
invoke criminal justice in serious cases, when no answer
can be found within their youth justice system.151
As far as raising the upper age limit is concerned, only
the Netherlands and Austria have developed a policy
regarding young adults who commit an offence after the
age of 18. In the Netherlands, the ‘adolescent criminal
law’ applies to persons up to 23 years old, whereas Aus-
tria provides for some adaptations for persons who have
not reached the age of 21. It is, however, still the Dutch
criminal court and not the youth court that applies these
youth justice provisions. The Dutch ACL therefore
implies that only the substantive provisions of the youth
justice systems are used with regard to young adults,
except for the HALT measure and community service.
In Austria, on the other hand, the application of youth
justice to young adults is restricted to procedural provi-
sions, because young adults are still subject to the range
of sentences of adult criminal law. As a consequence,
none of the six countries have established a full-fledged
young adult justice system.
3.2.2 Proposal for Clearer Terminology
As concerns the upper age limit, less confusion exists
compared with the lower age limit: the age from which
on a person is, in general, held accountable under the
adult criminal justice system is unambiguously called
the age of criminal majority (ACM). However, in all six
150. J. Put, Handboek Jeugdbeschermingsrecht (2015), at 299.
151. Weijers and Imkamp, above n. 1, at 278.
analysed countries, exceptions to the general ACM
exist: downwards, upwards or in both directions. The
lowering of the ACM, on the one hand, can either be
automatic or depend on a judicial decision. That is why
we suggest terming this exception ‘the advanced ACM’,
since minors are potentially subject to adult criminal law
before they have reached the ACM, which is 18 in these
six countries. The raising of the ACM, on the other
hand, could be considered a delay in addressing adults
under the criminal justice system. This exception could
therefore be called ‘the delayed ACM’.
Age of criminal majority (ACM)
The age, at the time of the offence, from which on a
person can be imposed an offence-oriented reaction
under the criminal justice system
Related concepts: advanced ACM; delayed ACM
3.3 Lower and Upper Age Limit for Certain
Reactions
3.3.1 Findings
Apart from the lower and upper age limit, all six coun-
tries have set at least one reaction-based age limit, either
an age limit from which certain reactions can be
imposed or an age limit until which reactions can last.
Three of them have introduced one or more age limits
from when a reaction can be imposed, while four of
them adopted one or more upper age limits regarding
certain reactions.
Whereas in the Netherlands, New Zealand and Austria
the general lower age limit of youth justice applies for
the imposition of all kind of reactions, Northern Ireland,
Belgium and Argentina have set some specific limits.
First of all, Northern Ireland sets the minimum age for
community services and probation at 16 years. The
three Belgian systems introduced a lower age limit
regarding custodial sentences, which can be imposed
only from the age of 14 (or even 16) onwards, whereas
their MACR/MAYR is 12 (or undefined in the French
Community). Only exceptionally can a minor be subject
to a custodial sentence from the age of 12, which is the
same as the MACR/MAYR in the Flemish Community
and Brussels. These higher under age limits show that
custodial sentences are given a specific place in the set of
possible reactions and confirm the last resort-nature of
detention of minors.
In addition, the Brussels’ CCC stipulates that working
for the purpose of paying damages can be ordered only
when the offender has turned 15. The French Com-
munity, on the other hand, in which the MACR/
MAYR is undefined, has adopted some implicit reac-
tion-based under age limits. The FCD states that
offenders under the age of 12 can be subject only to cer-
tain provisional, non-custodial measures, and only to a
reprimand as far as final measures are concerned. This
means that the age of 12 is the lower age limit for all the
other measures.
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Finally, Argentina is a peculiar case: although the lower
age limit of youth justice is set at 16, the reactions
imposed are only executable when the offender reaches
the age of 18 and after the offender has been subject to
at least one year of ‘protective treatment’. The result of
the protective treatment is taken into account in the
decision whether or not to execute the reaction imposed.
In other words, a minor, i.e. a person under 18 years
old, can never be subject to the execution of an offence-
oriented reaction in Argentina. These findings demon-
strate that the lower age of youth justice is not all-inclu-
sive or determinative and needs to be complemented
with other age limits.
As to the upper age limit for reactions, the Flemish
Community in particular, has a striking feature. Its gen-
eral upper age limit is set at 23, but there is a specific
age limit for custodial sentences. Long detention can be
applied until the age of 25, and in combination with pre-
ventive custody of 10 years, an offender who was a
minor at the time of the offence can even be detained
until the age of 35. In other words, this custodial sen-
tence can last until the offender is almost twice as old as
the ACM of the Flemish Community, which is 18.
Another example that shows that not only the lower and
upper age limits of youth justice are important is Aus-
tria. Austria provides four different upper ages for cus-
todial sentences – 18, 22, 24 and 27 – as an ultimate
upper limit. In the Netherlands, the maximum duration
of a PIY-measure (which is also a custodial sentence) is
seven years, which means the offender can be detained
until he or she is 30 years old in case the ACL system is
applied. Similar to the systems of the Flemish Com-
munity and Austria, the upper age limit of custodial
reactions is rather high compared with the ACM (18),
which points out, once again, the special nature of these
reactions.
New Zealand, on the other hand, is rather consistent:
apart from the ACM, which is 18, the upper age limit
for reactions (custodial sentences included) is 19. As a
consequence, supervision with residence orders has a
short and limited duration. In order to cope with this
low age-border that separates children from adults, seri-
ous offences committed by a minor are tried in adult
court, where his young age can be considered as a miti-
gating circumstance.
In the French Community and in Brussels a distinction
in age limits is made between provisional and final
measures. In both regions the provisional measures end
at the age of 20 and the final measures expires at the age
of 18, with an exception upwards (20 in the French
Community and 23 in Brussels). A reprimand can be
imposed at any age.
3.3.2 Proposal for Clearer Terminology
These findings demonstrate that a youth justice system
cannot be reduced to a system consisting of a lower and
an upper limit and that the duo MACR/MAYR and
ACM is an unsatisfactory dichotomy. The foregoing
examples show that the under and upper age limits for
certain reactions are influential as well. This third type
of age limits has been unexplored territory until now.152
Because of the relevance of this category of age limits in
legal practice, it should be recognised as a distinct and
individual age limit. The age limit for certain reactions
can be unified in one comprehensive term, namely the
‘reaction age limit’ (RAL). The lower age limit for cer-
tain reactions should be called the ‘lower reaction age
limit (lower RAL)’, whereas for the upper age limit for
certain reactions the label ‘upper reaction age limit
(upper RAL)’ is suitable.
Reaction age limits (RAL)
Related concept: Lower RAL
The age, at the time of the offence, from which on a
certain offence-oriented reaction can be imposed to a
minor under the youth justice system
Related concept: Upper RAL
The age, at the time of the execution of the reaction,
until which offence-oriented reactions last under the
youth justice system
3.4 Age Categories Within Reactions
3.4.1 Findings
Now that we have discussed the reaction-based lower
and upper age limits, a fourth age category arises. Five
out of the six countries examined have adopted certain
age limits within reactions.
The Netherlands, Northern Ireland, the Flemish Com-
munity and Austria have set up a layered system for
custodial sentences depending on the age of the offend-
er. In the Netherlands minors between the age of 12 and
16 can be subject only to a custodial sentence of twelve
months, whereas on offenders aged 16 or older a custo-
dial sentence with a maximum duration of 24 months
can be imposed. The same goes for Austria: children
aged 14 but less than 16 can get a custodial sentence
with a maximum duration of ten years, while offenders
aged 16 and 17 can be subject to sentences of fifteen
years. In Northern Ireland the maximum duration of a
custodial sentence for children between 10 and 17 years
is two years, whereas there is no maximum duration for
offenders aged 17 until 21. The ‘long detention’ system
of the Flemish Community consists of three layers: a
duration of a maximum of two years for minors aged 12
and 13, a maximum of five years for minors aged 14 and
15 and a maximum of seven years for minors 16 or 17
years old.
In Northern Ireland and New Zealand, on the other
hand, the amount of the payments and/or the person
who needs to pay varies according to the age of the
offender. In Northern Ireland, children aged 10 to 14
who committed an offence do not have to pay a fine
themselves; instead, their parent or guardian should.
Once children have reached the age of 14, the amount of
152. For an overview of the age limits for custodial sentences in Europe:
Dünkel et al., above n. 2, at 1793.
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the fine increases. Minors between the age of 16 and 18,
finally, have to pay the fine themselves. Similarly, in
New Zealand minors only have to pay the costs of the
prosecution themselves from the age of 16. Regarding
minors between the age of 10 but less than 16 the
parents have to pay these costs.
3.4.2 Proposal for Clearer Terminology
The fact that youth justice systems are ‘layered’, mean-
ing that the weight or height of certain measures
depends on the age of the offender at the time of the
offence, shows once again that several subcategories of
age limits exist within a youth justice system, between
the two extreme age limits that define its scope. Con-
necting the age of an offender to certain consequences
(the degree or duration of sentencing) allows systems to
respond to the degree of maturity and responsibility of
the offender. Age limits of this type can be called the
internal age limits of reactions (IALR).
Internal age limits of reactions (IALR)
The age, at the time of the offence, which determines
the degree or duration of the offence-oriented reac-
tion that can be imposed on a minor under the youth
justice system
3.5 Competent Court and Detention Institutions
Depending on Age
3.5.1 Findings
The final category of age limits concerns a more proce-
dural part, namely the jurisdiction of the existing actors
in youth justice. This category can be divided into two
subcategories: the competent court (trial), on the one
hand, and the competent services and institutions (exe-
cution), on the other hand.
Following the upper age limit of youth justice (18 in all
the systems discussed), an offender who had not reached
the age of 18 at the time of the offence is tried in youth
court (and sentenced according to youth justice law),
while offenders of at least 18 years of age at the time of
the offence are sentenced in adult court based on the
provisions of criminal law. However, only in Argentina
does this rule apply unexceptionally. In the other coun-
tries, two types of exceptions exist to this general rule:
(1) the trial of an offender under the age of 18 in crim-
inal court because of a transfer and (2) the trial of an
offender aged 18 in adult court according to youth jus-
tice law or the trial of an offender under the age of 18 in
youth court according to criminal law.
The most common exception is the transfer system.
Three of the countries examined, namely Northern Ire-
land, New Zealand and Belgium, have introduced a
procedure in which a minor can be tried in criminal
court according to criminal law. In Northern Ireland
this is possible from the age of 10 in the case of homi-
cide or co-accusation with an adult (although the sen-
tencing of the co-accused minor occurs in youth court
according to youth justice law), whereas in all Belgian
systems only minors who are at least 16 years old at the
time of the offence and commit a traffic offence are
automatically tried in the adult criminal court according
to criminal law. In New Zealand, children between the
age of 10 and 14 are automatically transferred to the
adult court when they are charged with murder or hom-
icide. Regarding young persons (14-18 years old), the
trial automatically takes place in adult court in certain
cases (automatic transfer), while in other cases the youth
court has the power to decide whether or not to transfer
(judicial transfer).
The second exception to the general rule can be found
in the Netherlands and in Belgium. The provisions of
criminal law exceptionally apply to offenders aged 16
and 17, but only concerning the reactions available (sub-
stantive law). It is the youth court that remains compe-
tent to try these minors (procedural law). In the Nether-
lands the exception also applies the other way around,
meaning that young adults (18-23 years old) are tried in
criminal court according to youth justice law. In that
sense this category is more a nuance than an actual
exception, because it only adopts the substantive reac-
tion possibilities of the age-appropriate system and not
its procedure. However, in Belgium even this nuance
has to be nuanced: those 16- and 17-year-olds can be
tried only by a specialised non-permanent chamber of
the youth court with both criminal judges and judges
with expertise of youth justice law.153 Considering that
this chamber is non-permanent and criminal judges also
participate, the chamber lies somewhere in between the
youth and adult court.
Lastly, the competent detention institutions vary
depending on the age of the offender, which must be,
contrary to the other age limits, generally determined at
the time of the execution. The analysis examined the
age limits of only final custodial sentences, therefore
excluding remand in custody or mediation services.
While one would presume that minors are detained in
specialised youth institutions but transferred to adult
prison once they attain the age of 18, this presumption
can be rebutted. Again with the exception of Argentina,
the analysis of the countries shows that several excep-
tions to this (alleged) general rule exist.
Apart from Belgium, where juvenile offenders remain in
youth institutions for the whole duration of the imposed
reaction, the competent detention institution often
relates to the upper age limit for custodial sentences
(which is mostly higher than the ACM and the upper
RAL). The ACL system in the Netherlands, for
example, allows offenders to be held in young offenders
institutions until the age of 23. Likewise, offenders can
be detained in an Austrian institution for youth deten-
tion until the age of 27. In Northern Ireland, juvenile
offenders are detained in a juvenile justice centre or a
young offenders centre, depending on the type of custo-
dial sentence. Once he or she has reached the age of 21,
the judge can decide whether or not to transfer him or
her to an adult prison. The age of 24 is the ultimatum;
153. Serious offences will be dealt with in the court of assizes.
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offenders are then automatically transferred to adult
prison.
In New Zealand, to the contrary, the competent deten-
tion institution relates to the transfer system (causing a
trial in adult court with adult sentences), as described
previously. More specifically, both children as young
persons are usually detained in a youth justice residence,
but young persons can also be sent to prison in case a
transfer to the criminal justice system has occurred.
3.5.2 Proposal for Clearer Terminology
These last age limits can be named the ‘court age limits’
(CAL) and the ‘detention institutions age limits’
(DIAL), all together called the ‘actors age limits’
(AAL). The CAL is mainly a combination of the poten-
tial ACM, the (general) ACM and the delayed ACM.
The DIAL, on the other hand, is, next to the aforemen-
tioned combination, influenced by the general, lower
and upper RAL and the lower and upper RALs of cus-
todial sentences. Nevertheless, both the CAL and the
DIAL are distinct age limits with their own characteris-
tics and purpose. Defining those age limits is therefore a
way to emphasise their individuality and contributes to
the conceptual coherence in youth justice.
Actors age limits (AAL)
Related concept: Court age limits (CAL)
The age, at the time of the offence, which determines
the competent court in which a person will be tried
Related concept: Detention institution age limits
(DIAL)
The age, at the time of the execution of the reaction,
which determines the competent detention institution
in which a person will be detained
4 Conclusion
This article, first of all, demonstrates that the distinc-
tion between the MACR and ACM is too general,
considering the finesse and layers that are to be found in
youth justice systems. More specifically, it is shown that
this traditional pair must be completed with three other
types of age limits. In the end, youth justice systems can
consist of five clusters of age limits: the (raised) mini-
mum age of criminal/youth justice responsibility
(MACR/MAYR), the (advanced and delayed) age of
criminal majority (ACM), the (lower and upper) reac-
tion age limits (RAL), the internal age limits of reactions
(IALR) and the actors age limits (AAL), which consist
of the court age limits (CAL) and the detention institu-
tion age limits (DIAL). Each type of age limit has its
own impact on the youth justice system and its own
consequences with regard to the juvenile offender,
which are displayed in the table in Section 5.
Apart from raising awareness of those other influential
age limits, this article clarifies the meaning of the
MACR. Owing to the long-standing ill-defined nature
of this notion, different interpretations have arisen in
several countries. The ensuing practical implications of
this issue cannot be underestimated, as it is a key con-
cept in children’s rights. Therefore, we created a new
term, which is more suitable and avoids confusion: the
minimum age of youth justice responsibility (MAYR).
Nevertheless, the value of the MACR/MAYR can also
not be overestimated. The other age limits discussed
prove that the main focus of the academic world on, and
the importance of, the MACR/MAYR is slightly exag-
gerated.
Another reason for confusion and haziness in the field of
age limits that is detected in this article is the lack of
attention concerning the moment upon which the per-
son must have reached the age limit. It is often unclear
whether the criterion is the age at the time of the
offence, the age at the time of the judgment or the age at
the time of the execution of the reaction. The age at the
time of the offence is the most common momentum,
since it is the general criterion for the MACR/MAYR,
ACM, lower RAL, internal age limit of reactions and
CAL. This consistency is remarkable, but probably
owing to the attention of the international institutions in
children’s rights on this criterion.154 The lower RAL in
Argentina (age at the time of the execution of the reac-
tion) and the internal age limit of reactions concerning
fines in Northern Ireland (age at the time of the judg-
ment) show that this rule is also not free from excep-
tions.
Furthermore, this article wants to give an incentive to
examine age limits in systems other than youth justice,
as such systems can equally influence the way in which
the criminal behaviour of a minor is reacted upon. On
the one hand, all six systems seem to have introduced a
practice of dealing with child offenders who have not
yet reached the MACR/MAYR under some type of
youth welfare or civil law. The underlying idea of these
systems is the same: a child can be subject to such a
youth care system only if it finds him- or herself in some
kind of problematic situation (‘growing and parenting
problems, psychological problems and disorders’, ‘in
need’, ‘likely to suffer significant harm’, etc.) However,
this theoretical basis on which the youth care system
comes into effect may be used differently in practice.
For example, in Argentina, children the age of 16 who
commit an offence are not punishable but are frequently
detained on the basis of youth care provisions. Despite a
high MACR/MAYR, the youth care system in Argenti-
na is thus often used to deal with impunity. In conclu-
sion, the table in the next section illustrates the theoreti-
cal age limits but does not take into account practical
deviations.
On the other hand, the analysis focuses only on
‘offence-oriented reactions’ and explicitly excludes reac-
tions in administrative law, even though custodial reac-
tions can be imposed under such systems as well. Exam-
ining reactions imposed under youth care, civil or
154. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, above n. 5, at 9-10.
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administrative legislation would therefore certainly be a
valuable extension of our preliminary study.
Finally, this analysis is limited to six countries, which is
obviously too small a number to be able to make firm
conclusions. Although these countries are carefully
selected on the basis of varied characteristics (European
versus non-European, alleged low versus high MACR/
MAYR, etc.), a study of six youth justice systems can-
not be generalised without further research in other
countries. We therefore strongly encourage the expan-
sion of this experimental study and continued research
regarding the different age limits in different countries
in order to refine our proposed conceptual framework.
5 Table: An Overview of the
Five Clusters of Age Limits in
Six Countries
The following table is a visualisation of the several dis-
tinguished age limits and the newly proposed names,
albeit in a simplified way. More information on the pos-
sible exceptions and nuances can be found in the coun-
try analyses in chapter 2 of this article.
The following abbreviations are used in the table: Flem-
ish Community (Fl), French Community (Fr), Brussels
(Br), exceptionally (exc.), juvenile justice centre order
(JJCO), custody care order (CCO), time of the judg-
ment (J), time of the execution of the judgment (E).
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The Netherlands Northern Ireland New Zealand Belgium Austria Argentina
Minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR)/
Minimum age of youth justice responsibility (MAYR)


























Age of criminal majority (ACM)
The age, at the time of the offence, from which a person can be imposed an offence-oriented reaction under the criminal justice
system
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The Netherlands Northern Ireland New Zealand Belgium Austria Argentina
Upper reaction age limits (Upper RAL)
The age, at the time of the execution of the reaction, until which offence-oriented reactions last under the youth justice system
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Internal age limits of reactions (IALR)
The age, at the time of the offence, which determines the degree or duration of the offence-oriented reaction that can be imposed
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The Netherlands Northern Ireland New Zealand Belgium Austria Argentina
Court age limits (CAL)
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The Netherlands Northern Ireland New Zealand Belgium Austria Argentina
Detention institutions age limits (DIAL)
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